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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit 
foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD 
provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. 
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, 
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Since 1964, Mozambique has lived through three distinct conflict situations—the 1964-
75 fight for independence from Portugal, the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces 
during Mozambique’s support to Zimbabwe, and the 1980-992 conflict between the 
FRELIMO government and the rebel RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South 
Africa. As a result, Mozambique’s mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 
contamination is complex; it combines large minefields around key infrastructure, 
defensive minefields around military installations, and a large number of small 
minefields and ERW that are randomly scattered around the country. 
 
The response to Mozambique’s contamination officially began in 1992, when the UN 
Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), primarily charged to lead the peace process, 
was also mandated to manage demining operations. However, due to various internal 
complications, ONUMOZ did not initiate demining operations until mid-1994, five 
months before the mission’s end. In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by 
international NGO operators such as Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust, as 
well as UN agencies such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), which, together with UNDP, trained and employed 400 Mozambican deminers 
as part of the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). With the creation of the 
National Demining Commission (Comissao Nacional de Desminagem; CND), in 1995, as 
an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between the functions of a mine 
action authority and a mine action centre, Mozambique seemed to take an important 
step towards owning the national mine action programme. However, it remained under 
funded and poorly staffed, and all of its few uncoordinated capacity development 
efforts yielded no concrete results.  
 
In 1999, in response to its poor performance, the CND was replaced by the National 
Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous 
statutory body reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. IND was in charge of 
proposing polices and strategies, coordinating mine action activities, developing 
standards and mobilising resources. But since most of the funding came through 
operators, it remained virtually independent, choosing where and how to use its funds. 
This certainly weakened IND’s ownership and management of mine action as a whole, 
but did not hinder its progress in developing capacity in partnership with UNDP and 
others. Similar to what happened when ONUMOZ left in 1994, the end of the ADP 
highlighted IND’s (and the Mozambican government’s) lack of authority over mine 
action in the country. Conceived as a temporary project, rather than as a programme of 
international assistance to a national mine action authority, the ADP lacked a transition 
component. There were no national entities able to define relevant policies, take 
command and effectively manage the mine action programme. For this reason, rather 
than a planned transition, IND experienced an improvised, ad hoc effort to fill the gap 
left. And although IND’s staff is performing better and gaining more access to 
discretionary resources, its authority over operators remains limited. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mozambique shares its borders with six countries and has a 2,500 km coastline on the 
Indian Ocean to the east. It has 22.4 million inhabitants and 800,000 km
2 
of land. 
 
The country is divided into ten provinces which are grouped into three regions:  
 
• north (three provinces) 
• centre (four provinces)  
• south (three provinces)
1
, with the capital Maputo located at the southernmost 
tip  
 
Despite impressive economic growth rates, due mainly to a handful of mega projects, 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with some 55 per cent of its 
population living in absolute poverty. The country is heavily dependent on donor 
assistance in the form of projects, and also directly, for about half the national budget. 
This dependence has meant that the Bretton Woods institutions and donors have 
considerable influence on the government’s policies and programmes. 
 
The Mozambique population have lived through three distinct conflict situations:  
 
• the 1964-1975 fight for independence from Portugal  
• the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces when Mozambique supported 
Zimbabwe’s fight for  independence  
• the 1980-1992 conflict between the FRELIMO government and the rebel 
RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South Africa  
 
All of these factors have affected the nature of minefield contamination and how it has 
been tackled. Because of these conflicts, there are:  
 
• a combination of large minefields around key infrastructure 
• defensive minefields around military installations and some settlements 
• a large number of small, scattered minefields and UXO  
 
This means that the logistics of surveys, clearance, quality assurance (QA) and 
explosives ordnance destruction (EOD) are complex and time-consuming.  
 
 
                                                    
1
 Mine action is an exception – the central Zambézia province is combined with the north, making up all the country 
north of the Zambezi river that was HALO’s operational area. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:  
THE START-UP PHASE 1992-1995 
 
Between 1992 and 1994, the UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) led a peace 
process. At this time the government was weak, and the UN and the donors were the 
key players. What happened then determined how the mine situation would be tackled 
thereafter and how the institutional capacity to coordinate and manage the programme 
would evolve.    
 
A few months into the peace process, the UN prepared a demining plan. It focused on: 
 
a) demining as a military, operational issue; using commercial companies to 
speedily verify roads and carry out clearance 
b)  building on national mine clearance capacity  
 
In the end however, ONUMOZ demining began only in June 1994, five months before its 
mandate ended. This happened because: 
 
• approving the plan was delayed 
• there were conflicts between the UN and donors over whom to award the 
commercial contracts 
• the contracting process itself was lengthy 
 
In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by bilateral donor funding for commercial and 
international non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators.  
 
In 1993, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) began working in the three central provinces of 
Tete, Manica and Sofala, with Norwegian funding. In 1994, HALO Trust began working in 
central Zambézia province with UK funding, and rapidly expanded to the three northern 
provinces. The indigenous capacity component of the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plan involved the training of 400 deminers, and a UNDP 
project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), was launched to employ them. As 
HALO was in the north and NPA in the centre, ADP started operations in the three 
southern provinces in October 1994.  
 
In mid-1994, with a view to establishing post-ONUMOZ capacity, the UN suggested a 
set-up along the lines of the Cambodian model, with:  
 
• an inter-ministerial authority as the governing oversight entity  
 3 
 
• a national mine action centre (MAC), with an operational wing that would 
intervene directly, coordinate and plan  
 
However, concerns were raised, that it would be a top-heavy, expensive, para-statal 
replication of the work already being done by operators on the ground. The issue was 
still left unresolved when ONUMOZ came to an end in late 1994, leaving an institutional 
vacuum.  
 
In the end, the transition was unprepared, ad hoc and unorganised. There were no 
national entities able to take command of an effective mine action programme, define 
overall policy, or direct, coordinate and manage the programme.  
 
INITIAL CONSOLIDATION (1995-1999) AND MATURATION (1995-
2004) PHASES, AND TRANSITION TO UNDP 
INITIAL CONSOLIDATION PHASE: 1995-1999 NATIONAL DEMINING 
COMMISSION (COMISSAO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM (CND) 1995-1999) 
 
For some six months after ONUMOZ’s arrival, there was no national mine action body, 
but it did not seem to hamper the work of HALO, NPA or ADP. They continued to 
mobilise their own resources and self-regulate, with individual plans and priorities 
reflecting their different corporate cultures. There was little or no communication 
between them. 
 
In May 1995, the government created the National Demining Commission (Comissao 
Nacional de Desminagem; CND) under the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 
as an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between, the functions of a mine 
action authority and a mine action centre. The function of the former was handled by a 
“policy-making arm” made up of several ministries.
2
 The mine action centre element, 
including data collection, clearance planning, establishing procedures, monitoring and 
coordinating demining activities, and licensing and tendering functions, was to be taken 
care of in the Executive Director’s office. However, it was poorly staffed, and the few 
disjointed capacity-building efforts (which took two and a half years and cost some USD 
3 million), had limited effects.   
 
Operators continued to receive donor funding and consolidate their positions during 
1995-1999. Meanwhile, Mozambique became one of the first countries to sign and 
ratify the Ottawa Convention (in 1997 and 1998 respectively). In 1998, Handicap 
International started humanitarian demining in Inhambane province. 
 
                                                    
2
 Ministries of Economy, Finance, Home Affairs and Defence, with Health, Labour and Social Affairs as occasional 
members. 
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MATURATION PHASE 1999-2004/5: NATIONAL DEMINING INSTITUTE 
(INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM – IND) 
 
In June 1999, the CND was replaced by the National Demining Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous statutory body run by a director 
reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meant that the tentative 
“policy-making arm”, the committee that might have performed something of an 
authority function, disappeared and was replaced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.   
  
The IND was in charge of: 
 
• proposing policies and strategies 
• proposing and executing plans 
• facilitating coordination, management and control of mine action activity 
• developing standards 
• mobilising resource 
• maintaining the IMSMA database and quality assurance 
 
It also had a corresponding departmental structure.
3
 It later established regional offices 
in the north and centre of the country. It had a management committee made up of 
department heads and a technical council, with representatives from ministries with the 
greatest interest in mine action
4
. It was responsible for organising annual meetings with 
operators, donors and other stakeholders.  
 
Within a year there were a number of significant developments:  
 
• 2000 – launch of a UNDP capacity-building project, with a six-person technical 
advisory (TA) team, which helped provide the IND with a solid framework and 
basic working tools and procedures 
• 2001 – a one-year UNDP mine action flood-related emergency project 
• 2001 – publication of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) report   
• 2001 – initiatives to transform ADP into a national NGO or mine action clearance 
agency  
 
In addition, the German operator MgM arrived in 2000, the US Department of Defense 
helped build the army’s demining capacity, and the commercial operator, RONCO, 
received US funding to establish a “quick reaction demining force” (QRDF) of 
Mozambican deminers who, when not deployed overseas, worked in the centre and 
                                                    
3
 Studies/planning /information, operations, international relations as well as the “business” departments of 
administration/finance and human resources 
4
 Nothing akin to National Mine Action Authority, this is a consultative body that gives opinions on annual reports and 
plans or other matters, when requested to do so by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 5 
 
south of the country. IND also tried to encourage the creation of Mozambican 
commercial operators.    
 
Within a short time, it was recognised that, albeit with difficulty, the IND was 
performing somewhat better than its predecessor and its capacity was improving. 
Donor support for demining increased considerably, and IND presented its first multi-
year plan 2002-2006, based on the LIS. The aim was to achieve “mine impact free 
status” by 2006, by clearing all high and medium impact sites. 
 
Despite these advances, there were still some major problems on the horizon.  
 
THE OPERATORS 
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING OPERATORS 
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP):  transition from UN to indigenous 
capacity 
 
In June 1994, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) was established as a UNDP 
project to employ deminers trained by peacekeepers, but with little thought to its 
future. ADP existed as a UNDP project in two phases (1994-2000 and 2000-2005) and 
operated in the three southern provinces.   
 
It received considerable donor funding, channelled through UNDP, as well as technical 
advisory support, mainly from military advisors from Australian and New Zealand, and it 
benefited from several overseas specialist training courses. ADP had a training centre in 
Moamba, Maputo province that eventually became the main capacity-building source 
for operators in Mozambique; providing basic, refresher and specialist courses. It also 
sent personnel for service overseas.5  
 
In March 2001, when it still had five technical advisors, a new UNDP project attempted 
to address ADP’s future. The “transformation of ADP into an NGO” project document 
was referred to in ADP reports as the “transition document”. The objective was 
“support for national capacity” by producing a “fully operational national NGO”.  
 
Although the objectives and outputs of the project document cover solely the 
transformation process, the text refers to a mine action budget of USD 4 million a year, 
so mine action activities continued (the final expenditure for the period was at least 
USD 6.35 million – see Annex 1).  Indeed, according to ADP, the project document was a 
“strategic document”, with strategic objectives “based upon an external requirement” 
and, as such, did not allow stakeholders to assess ADP’s “institutional development” 
                                                    
5
  According to the ADP 2004 report: Lebanon, Guinea Bissau, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, Croatia, Azerbaijan and Angola.  
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activities. ADP, therefore, produced its own operational project document, containing 
mine action objectives, outputs, activities and indicators;
6
 it also submitted two types of 
reports to UNDP: strategic and operational.  
 
As progress on transforming ADP into a local NGO was minimal, this meant that what 
was happening on the ground did not reflect what was outlined in the official UNDP 
project document. Evidence suggests that UNDP went along with this, as it continued to 
channel demining funds to ADP.  
 
The “transition” effort by both parties appears to have been weak. The main output was 
a May 2002 consultancy report which concluded that an NGO option was not viable.
7
 
When the study’s findings were presented to a donor stakeholder meeting in November 
2002,
8
 the participants reportedly concurred and decided on “more of the same”
9
 (ie 
that UNDP, IND and ADP should develop a proposal for the establishment of a UNDP 
NEX
10
 project under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
 
In 2003, ADP still had two technical advisors and USD 2.1 million for operations. 
However, its status was uncertain, and the perception that the mine threat was “not so 
serious”, made more hesitant. An added financial concern was that by changing its 
status from a UNDP project to an NGO, ADP would have to pay its staff some USD 1.8 
million in immediate compensation.
11
 
 
However, it appears that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the proposal, 
so a new project document
12
 was issued for the period July 2004 to June 2005. The 
objective was to establish a “legal framework”
13
 that would allow ADP to exist as a 
“non-profit making demining operator”. It would take the form of an association of 
senior ADP staff, and be known as the “Associated Demining Programme”. Work 
proceeded with the appointment of a governing board, preparation of the required staff 
establishment for national coverage and the drafting of a strategy and vision documents   
 
The process was halted, however, by events in early 2005, when frustrated deminers 
went on strike for non-payment of wages. ADP’s director resigned and, by June, ADP 
                                                    
6
 None of this was mentioned in the official ProDoc signed by the UNDP Res Rep, the IND Director and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 
7
 The former ADP director noted that this would have been evident if a minimum of effort had gone into preparing 
the project document.  There was clearly only minimal preparation with no kind of needs assessment.  
8
 It has not been possible to consult the minutes of the meeting. 
9
 This was based on the report’s option 4: “Keep ADP as a project and redefine its institutional relationship with IND 
and other government institutions.” 
10
 National Execution – implemented by the government on the basis of annual work plans and quarterly 
disbursements, as is the case with the current UNDP small arms/mine action project 
11
 This would be severance payment from ADP as a UNDP project, in line with Mozambique’s provisions for 
termination of employment. It appears that UNDP never registered ADP personnel as employees; so did not make 
mandatory contributions into the social security system to cover termination payments.  
12
 ProDoc not available, current information taken from 2004 ADP report.   
13
 Not new legislation, more like legal documentation 
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had collapsed. Compensation, including the legally-mandated severance payments, was 
eventually paid to the retrenched deminers through contributions from UNDP (USD 
400,000) and Ireland (Euro 250,000), with the government of Mozambique covering the 
balance of some USD 1.1 million.
14
 
 
Although ADP was, according to IND, recognised as being very engaged and carrying out 
quality work,
15
 very few of their demining activities were recorded in IMSMA. There is 
no conclusive evidence to say if this was due to difficulties with IND’s database unit or a 
lack of reporting on ADP’s side. The former ADP director insists that he always sent the 
required task and clearance information to IND, but the whereabouts of ADP’s own 
demining database – or the original documents – is unclear. 
 
Why did this happen? How could these deminers not have been used as a national force 
for the final push for compliance with Mozambique’s mine clearance obligations, 
instead of working for a foreign operator? There are many opinions. Contributing 
factors appear to have been personality clashes, intra-governmental intrigue, IND 
concern that ADP wanted to take it over by becoming its operational wing, donor 
reluctance, opposition by the international operators, government disinterest, the 
compensation problem and all the complications of the crisis years – when ADP was 
both a contributor and a victim. It is, however, clear that ADP was a UNDP project, and 
so was partially responsible for what happened.     
 
HALO Trust 
 
In mid-1993, the HALO Trust was hired by ONUMOZ to do the first rapid survey of the 
landmine situation throughout the country. In February 1994 the HALO trust supported 
three British humanitarian NGOs in demining in the central Zambézia province, and then 
soon expanded north to Niassa in 1995, Cabo Delgado in 1996 and Nampula in 1997
16
, 
covering 48 per cent of the country’s area and more than half its population. In 1998 it 
felt that it could complete these provinces by 2003, and was contemplating training and 
leaving behind small “fire brigades” to deal with residual problems. However, after 
deciding to do full clearance the end date was put back to around 2007 and the fire 
brigade idea dropped.  
 
HALO’s priority was to roughly assess areas, based on humanitarian concerns and 
development and infrastructure plans (government or commercial), and the provincial 
government was to approve the overall demining plan. Operating in the entire country 
                                                    
14
 However, the story did not quite end there, In January 2006 the Price Waterhouse Coopers company produced a 
“Final Report – Facilitation of a Business Plan for Associated Demining Project” funded by UNDP and there was news 
that the Associated Demining Project had been registered. However, it was never heard of again.  
15
 The fact that the former ADP director is now a RONCO consultant organising assignments in half a dozen countries 
for up to 400 Mozambican deminers, most of them former ADP employees, suggests the organisation was capable. 
16
 Financed by DFID, Ireland, Switzerland and USA/Netherlands respectively. 
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north of the Zambezi river, with no presence to speak of in the capital, HALO’s contacts 
with IND were minimal, other than sending information for the IMSMA database and 
attending operator meetings.    
 
Before leaving, HALO was to carry out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey of the 
four provinces. However, HALO did not leave as planned, but rather was asked by IND to 
conduct a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces. It is now working in 
Maputo, Manica and Tete provinces. 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
 
NPA was for many years heavily engaged in rural development projects in the three 
central provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. In 1994, it decided to start demining 
operations that would be closely linked to its rural development work.  
 
NPA’s priorities were different to HALO’s, in that they were linked to its rural 
development background. One of NPA’s principles was linking demining to 
humanitarian wellbeing, and clearance was often followed by a local development 
initiative. NPA’s survey method (task impact assessment) focused on the increased 
production and income that was generated by clearing a certain hazard.    
 
In 2004, NPA announced that it would stop demining operations in Mozambique. This 
was linked to the fact that the Norwegian embassy had made the decision to stop 
funding humanitarian mine action in Mozambique after noting that under the 2002-
2006 IND strategy, all mined areas would be identified by 2006, and all high and 
medium impact areas cleared. Based on its own experience, NPA must have known that 
this was not going to be the case, but clearly was unable to transmit the message to the 
embassy, so the programme was closed and NPA left in 2006. NPA has pointed out that, 
before closing down its operations, it encouraged staff to create a national mine action 
NGO, highlighting that it would hand over its demining equipment, but that this never 
materialised, since there was little interest in doing so. 
 
Handicap International (HI) 
 
HI (France) began working in Mozambique as an agency assisting people with 
disabilities, ie amputee mine victims. HI compiled a considerable database on the 
location of suspected minefields and was very engaged in mine risk education. In 1998, 
it started demining in Inhambane in the south, one of the most densely mined provinces 
in the country.
17
  After NPA left, IND asked HI to expand and cover Manica and Sofala 
provinces. 
                                                    
17
 Inhambane contained half the SHAs identified in the Baseline Assessment  
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Compared to the other INGOs, HI is relatively small and does not have a strong 
fundraising capacity. Until recently, its main funds came from the Canadian government 
and the Canadian Auto Workers union, with some support from HI’s head office in Lyon. 
However, as IND began to gain access to more discretionary funding, it was able to 
increase its allocations to HI. Unlike the other international operators, all of HI’s staff, 
including the field director, are Mozambican, making it a national operator in all but 
name.  
 
Given its capacity constraints, HI concentrated on “proximity demining” of small sites 
under 15,000 m
2
. After clearing its priority sites, the organisation decided to follow a 
district by district approach to the remaining small sites and mark all those over 
15,000m
2
, before closing at the end of 2006. However, IND asked it to stay and clear all 
sites in Inhambane, Manica and Sofala. Therefore, HI decided to conduct a 
“comprehensive survey” of all communities in the three provinces. It is now working 
only in Inhambane and Sofala provinces as, in the meantime, HALO has taken over 
Manica.  
 
APOPO 
 
This Belgian-Tanzanian organisation began work in Mozambique in 2004, initially testing 
its rat-based survey and clearance approach in Manica with NPA. It then moved to 
Inhambane to continue testing with HI. In 2007-08, IND asked APOPO to start clearance 
on its own in Gaza province.     
Others 
 
The German NGO MgM was present between 2000 and 2003, and the Mozambican 
army (FADM) has also worked somewhat sporadically on demining.  
 
The US State Department funded a RONCO Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) of 
Mozambican deminers that, when not on assignments overseas, operated in the centre 
and south.   
 
INGOs and IND 
 
The post-war effort made by ONUMOZ stressed clearance, not the creation and 
strengthening of a national mine action centre and authority.  Consequently, the 
conflict-ridden ONUMOZ/OCHA transition effectively resulted in the country being 
divided into three independent operator areas. Because demining resources were tied 
to these areas, nationwide priorities could not be addressed.  
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The three regions operated separately, with different: 
 
• resources 
• work methods 
• ways of relating to communities and local authorities 
• criteria for defining priorities  
• fundraising abilities   
 
In the face of three strong independent operators, IND faced an uphill task to assert its 
coordination-direction mandate. The INGOs carried out costly surveys in their 
respective areas, sometimes with little reference to IND, using different data collection 
methods and coverage, different criteria for categorising suspected hazards and 
different definitions of “completion”.  
 
Transition and ownership were therefore rather blurred. Much of what went wrong 
could have been avoided, had more attention been given to preparing the institutional 
foundations during ONUMOZ and the respective capacity-building requirements.   
 
COMMERCIAL OPERATORS 
 
Initially, international companies were used to verify and clear roads, but after 
ONUMOZ, there was a quieter period until reconstruction, and then development 
projects, started to pick up.  
 
Early in the decade, IND encouraged the creation of small Mozambican companies. This 
is relatively easy to do, requiring only articles of association and the company’s standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) (invariably a copy of the IND SOPs). These firms are usually 
run by former IND employees and deminers.   
 
According to IND records, there are currently 33 licensed entities:  
 
• three INGOs 
• eight national NGOs 
• 20 private mine action  
• two private quality assurance companies 
 
National NGOs and private companies have no permanent capacity, however. They 
recruit deminers and mobilise equipment only when they obtain a contract. IND 
inspection of their capacities is limited and when they work for investment companies 
or development projects they do not always send records of the work completed to IND 
(See some figures in Annex 8).  
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THE CRISIS YEARS: 2004 TO 2006-07 
 
Towards the middle of the decade, the mine action programme, as well as IND and 
UNDP in particular, went through a difficult time. This was due to a number of mutually 
reinforcing circumstances.  
 
After the antipersonnel mine ban convention had entered into force in 1999, a 
programme known as “Adopt a Minefield” (AAM) was created by United Nations 
Association-USA, to engage American civil society in mine action. In 2003 and 2004, a 
corruption scandal erupted over Adopt a Minefield
18
 funds, involving the head of the 
NPA demining programme, the Deputy Director of IND and a UNDP official, all of whom 
were dismissed. This was followed by press reports of abuse of funds by the incumbent 
IND director and his predecessor.   
 
Operators announced plans for closure. MgM left in 2003, ADP collapsed in 2005 and 
NPA left in 2006. HI made plans to leave at the end of 2006, once all the small sites 
remaining in Inhambane were cleared. HALO prepared to leave in mid-2007 after 
completing its Mine Impact Free District programme in the centre-north provinces. They 
confirmed the widespread sense that the mine problem was not as bad as had been 
thought, or else it had already been largely resolved. 
 
The UNDP capacity-building project in IND ended in 2005, with only a chief technical 
advisor post remaining. Because of this, IND lost a contingent of its best trained local 
staff, who had been on the UNDP project payroll; others were not paid for months while 
awaiting admission to the civil service.   
 
After using the findings of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) for the basis of its 2002-
2006 plan, IND started receiving operator reports of excessively contaminated areas and 
many unrecorded sites, to such an extent that the database unit had difficulty keeping 
track of the information. IND was unable to judge the real level of contamination, nor 
how long clearance might take, and UNDP was unable to help much, as it struggled to 
cope with the fall-out from the corruption scandal and the ADP debacle.
19
   
 
All these factors contributed to falling donor support for mine action – from almost USD 
23 million in 2002 to USD 17 million, 7.5 million and 4 million in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
respectively.
20
 
 
One of the main concerns of the 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine 
                                                    
18
 After the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention entered into force in 1999, Adopt a minefield (AAM) was created by 
United Nations Association-USA to engage American civil society in mine action. To date, AAM has raised over USD 25 
million for mine action, cleared over 1,000 minefields, and assisted thousands of survivors. 
http://www.landmines.org/Page.aspx?pid=374 
19
 A senior UNDP official has described this period as “UNDP’s dark history” 
20
 Mozambique’s Article 5 Extension Request, 30 April 2008 
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Action Programme in Mozambique
21
 was the serious problems that arose due to 
ignorance of the mine action challenges Mozambique faced. Its recommendations 
included joint efforts by IND and operators to:  
 
a) achieve a common definition of “mine impact free” and “mine free”  
b) decide on approaches for a complete resurvey  
c) discuss how to ensure accurate and up to date information in IMSMA  
 
 
THE SURVEYS 
 
Annex 1 lists the various actual and proposed surveys in Mozambique.  
 
One of the biggest problems in the history of IND and of mine action in Mozambique 
has been the absence of a clear picture of the scale and nature of contamination in the 
country. It also is somewhat telling of IND’s fragility that only the final survey conducted 
in 2007 was done at the behest of IND. All the others were external initiatives with no 
IND involvement.  
 
HALO TRUST SURVEY 1993 
 
The first four-month rough survey contracted by ONUMOZ considerably 
underestimated the problem but provided a useful starting point for the three larger 
operators.    
 
LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY (LIS) 1999-2001 
 
In 1998, Canada offered to fund a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) as part of a series of 
such surveys being launched in mine-affected countries. When consulted in 1998, HI, 
NPA and ADP thought a survey was probably a good idea to help prioritisation
22
, but 
HALO felt it was not necessary.  
 
The survey was carried out with little IND involvement, meaning there was no provision 
for a capacity-building input for the new institute. 
 
The survey report was only available in 2001, shortly after the UNDP started working 
                                                    
21
 IND, UNDP and GICHD, A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique, 2005, 
available through the GICHD’s Links and Information for Mine Action database: http://www.gichd.org/links-
information-database. 
22
 Even though the first two indicated that as a matter of urgency, and as the proposed LIS would probably take time, 
they were intending to do their own surveys to meet their data needs in their areas. 
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with IND and the results were not what stakeholders had expected. It was a sample 
survey and not the expected comprehensive census survey. It focused on affected 
communities rather than minefields, resulting in a gross overestimation of mined areas, 
and it seriously underestimated the number of minefields. 
 
Despite these flaws, the LIS became the basis for IND’s first multi-year plan 2002-2006, 
with unfortunate consequences. IND stated that it only recognised the LIS failings 
around 2004 when it started to put more emphasis on technical surveys
23
 to reduce the 
exaggerated areas, despite the fact that the operators on the ground had been critical 
from the start.  
HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 2005-07 
 
After expanding to Manica and Sofala provinces, HI decided to conduct a 
“comprehensive survey” of the three central provinces, which took place between 2005 
and 2007. HI worked in every village and community to confirm existing mine/UXO sites 
and to identify new ones and their size. It identified nine million km
2
 of 651 previously 
unknown SHAs, plus roads, although it was expected that the m
2
 area would be 
somewhat smaller after a tighter technical survey.  This was carried out when the HI 
survey findings were included in the baseline assessment. 
  
 NPA TASK IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
Prior to closing down in 2005-2006, NPA conducted a task impact assessment of the 
minefields it had cleared in its provinces between 1993 and 2005. It measured the 
impact and resurveyed the 521 SHAs in the provinces recorded by the LIS, although it 
was not a comprehensive survey of every community. After receiving additional funding 
from Norway, NPA extended the assessment to cover the southern provinces of Gaza 
and Maputo, despite having never worked there in the past.  
 
NPA’s fieldwork targeted “affected communities” rather than suspected minefields per 
se.
24
 The type of data gathered focused on beneficiary incomes and assistance after 
clearance. NPA gave IND detailed reports on each site, classifying them as high, 
medium, low and negligible impact. NPA would consider the province to be “mine 
impact free” if all sites in high, medium and low categories were cleared.  
 
HALO TRUST MINE IMPACT FREE DISTRICT SURVEY 
 
After concluding its clearance work in the centre-north provinces, the HALO Trust 
                                                    
23
 These were not technical surveys as defined by IMAS; rather, they were non-intrusive surveys designed to 
determine the polygon to be cleared. 
24
 For example, it only considered four out of 160 power line pylons in Maputo to be hazardous because they were 
the only ones with communities nearby, yet virtually all were mined and are now being cleared.   
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carried out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey to confirm that all known mines 
had been removed. It took place from October 2004 to June 2007 and involved 
interviews with 6,395 communities. In each location, the verification process 
culminated in the senior local government official signing off on the appropriate 
paperwork. An additional 74 new SHAs were identified and cleared, with 176 mines 
found and destroyed.  At the end of the exercise, HALO reported that it was satisfied it 
had made “every reasonable effort to identify all known mined areas and had cleared all 
known mined areas”.
25
  
 
IND did not accompany HALO’s work on the ground as its QA presence in the north was 
minimal at the time. Despite this however, NDI came under pressure to accept the 
results without verification. Although these results were cited in the Article 5 extension 
request, IND proceeded with a verification process, with a view to districts being 
officially declared “mine free” in accordance with IND procedures. During this process it 
identified a further 43 suspected mined sites and 34 UXO/EOD spot tasks.  At the time 
of writing, these were being demined by commercial operators with government funds.  
Other reports of sites requiring clearance turned out to be due to an incomplete 
handover process.  IND has now drafted a set of official handover procedures 
26
 and 
these have been distributed to provincial and district authorities.    
 
THE HALO BASELINE ASSESSMENT 
 
HALO Trust did not leave the country as planned after completing the MIFD survey. At 
IND’s request, it conducted a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces, based 
on existing records: LIS, pre and post LIS reports in the IMSMA database and the HI and 
NPA surveys.
27
   
 
The baseline assessment cancelled 71 per cent of the recorded SHAs and confirmed 
487. When the results were used as the basis of the National Mine Action Plan 2008-
2010, IND included additional SHAs, increasing the number from 487 to 541, and the 
area to 12.1 million m
2
.  The report and plan also included other sites that were known 
to exist but had not been surveyed or quantified:  
 
• Cahora Bassa dam 
• Chicamba dam 
• the border with Zimbabwe  
• one power line in Maputo and two in Sofala 
                                                    
25
 The Mine Impact Free Survey of Northern Mozambique Final Report. The HALO Trust. November 2007. 
26
 Now included as Chapter 5 of its revised SOPs “Procedimentos de Controle e Garantia de Qualidade para 
Operações de Desminagem em Moçambique”. 
27
 NPA (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Maputo) HI (Manica, Sofala and Inhambane).  So Manica/ Sofala had already been 
surveyed twice prior to the Baseline Assessment. 
 15 
 
• two railways and 33 roads  
 
The baseline assessment was based on existing records ie, it was not a new 
comprehensive survey of each community, as HALO felt that all SHAs were known. 
However, after HALO began demining in Maputo, it found 43 new sites, with an area of 
500,000 m
2
, in addition to the 50 recorded sites. These original 50 SHAs had been 
recorded as having an area of 602,248 m
2
, but in fact 29 were larger than originally 
surveyed, adding 608,917 m
2
, meaning the total predicted area more than doubled.
28
  
 
ON THE SURVEYS – TRANSITION FROM SCATTERED EVIDENCE TO HARD 
DATA 
 
Eight years passed between the rough survey carried out under ONUMOZ in 1993 and 
the LIS report in 2001. A further six years passed until, for the first time, the MIFD and 
the baseline assessment gave a much clearer picture of the landmine situation and 
enabled IND to produce a realistic and viable plan. Prior to the baseline assessment, 
there had been little IND involvement in or ownership of the various surveys. IND did 
not commission them nor did it have a say in the methods and criteria used.  They were 
outside initiatives and, in the case of the post-LIS surveys, they were done to meet the 
purposes of those who conducted them (ie exit strategies).  No IND involvement also 
meant no IND capacity development. These problems dated back to the LIS, as 
recognised in Mozambique’s 2008 Article 5 extension request:  
 
“…the limitations or flaws associated with the LIS …created considerable additional 
workload in having to revisit most sites and conduct additional stages of survey to 
better clarify the reality on the ground. The difficulty in determining an accurate end 
state may have contributed to some donor fatigue which in turn resulted in a slowdown 
of efforts to implement Article 5.”     
 
The LIS took place at a time when IND was still being set up and – instead of being a 
capacity-building instrument – it became just the opposite. 
 
IND’s credibility was undermined when it used the LIS data, which operators considered 
to be of little practical use, as the basis for its 2002-2006 plan. Instead of being a means 
of coordinating and controlling the operators, the plan made them even more 
independent. “The provincial and local authorities and the main humanitarian mine 
action (HMA) operators do not necessarily believe in or want to use the LIS data to 
prioritise their work. This has led to a situation where IND is largely left out of the 
discussion (on areas to be demined); the main actors in this discussion are the operator 
and the provincial level authority”.
29
  
                                                    
28
 The information on the additional area is inconsistent – see Annex 8 
29
 Evaluation of Global Landmine Process. Scanteam 
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The LIS operation was run from separate premises. IND was not involved in the 
planning, implementation or analysis, so a vital capacity-building opportunity was lost. 
However, it was a complicated time. Initial discussions on the LIS started under the CND, 
fieldwork took place in 2000 when the UNDP project was starting, with also an 
emergency flood project ongoing. IND’s ability to intervene in the LIS may have been 
limited, but it should have been better informed. It is difficult to understand why: 
 
a) the UNDP technical advisors participated in drafting the LIS-based plan  
b) they did not recommend or push for some kind of resurvey 
 
IND has since stated that it only realised the extent of the LIS problems around 2004, 
which speaks volumes about IND-operator communications, and IND’s awareness of the 
reality on the ground. There was no national uniformity (each operator with its own 
system and methodology) in how new areas were identified, recorded and prioritised, 
and with no clear picture of the situation and what was required to complete the 
demining programme, donor assistance was bound to falter.
30
  
 
UN GENDER GUIDELINES 
 
The UN gender guidelines have been widely applied in Mozambique, mainly due to the 
government’s strong position on the subject in a country where equality between men 
and women is laid down in the Constitution. This is important given that the gender 
content of many mine action activities is as much dependent on the composition and 
attitude of community structures and government entities as it is on the role of IND or 
operators. Surveys and prioritisation involve consultations with local communities 
where women are invariably present and free to voice their opinions. Mine risk 
education (MRE) takes place in schools, where at primary level, the number of boys and 
girls is roughly equal.  
 
Consultation exercises such as the validation of mine free districts involve district and 
locality Consultative Councils that always have at least one female member to express 
the views and defend the interests of women. In community consultations, rural women 
are always ready to voice their concerns. As they tend to be heavily involved in farming, 
the weight of agricultural production in impact assessments necessarily reflects their 
interests. 
 
In regard to demining entities, HALO has a section made up only of women, and HI has 
female deminers. The country manager of HALO, and the head of one of the most active 
                                                    
30
 Due to IND’s difficulty in maintaining accurate records in its IMSMA database, its adherence to LIS findings as the 
benchmark and its minimal involvement in operational government planning processes at the regional and provincial 
levels. . 
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commercial companies are women, as are three of IND’s six executive managers – the 
heads of the legal, international and human resource departments. After taking a 
Madison University course that included gender issues, the head of the legal 
department is now responsible for promoting gender awareness in mine action in 
Mozambique.  
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
EVOLVING ROLES OF UN AGENCIES AND OTHERS 
OCHA 
 
Mozambique was one of the first post-war countries to have a demining programme, 
and was therefore something of a learning experience for UN agencies. During the 
1992-94 peace process, the main OCHA concerns were resettlement, maintaining peace, 
demobilising the two armies and elections. Demining focused on road clearance in a 
highly politicised context, where time was of the essence, but joint decision-making by 
former warring parties was slow. The situation was further complicated by UN 
bureaucracy and UN-donor conflicts over demining contracts, and the future national 
mine action entity.  
 
Mine action was equated with clearance, and clearance with operational needs and 
commercial solutions. HMA was never a priority in Mozambique. The development of 
indigenous capacity focused on training and fielding demining teams. As no agreement 
was reached on assistance to a mine action centre by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate, 
there were no preparations for what might come after, (eg institutional set-up, 
responsibilities, resources, etc.)  
 
“The inability of the donors to reach consensus meant that one of the poorest war-torn 
countries in the world was not given the help it needed to have a voice in the way in 
which the problem of mines was addressed. The absence of a central coordination 
mechanism meant that it was up to the mine action agencies and the donors to 
determine where and how resources would be allocated and used”. 
31
 
 
UNDP 
 
The first instance of direct UNDP project support was the ADP, which ran for 11 years in 
two phases:  
 
• 1994-2000 (operational activities)  
• 2000-2005 (continued operational activities, and a failed attempt to turn ADP 
into a national demining organisation)   
 
The CND saw a few capacity-building initiatives, all of which failed, including a UNDP 
project between 1996 and 1998. In May 1999, a UNDP mission looked into transforming 
                                                    
31
 The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities – Mozambique Study Report. Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood, 
Norah Niland. OCHA Publications. 
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CND into an institute that would receive capacity-building support. It seems that the 
UN-donor relationship remained fragile and donors were unwilling to provide the 
necessary funding.
32
 However, when the government went ahead and created the IND 
in June 1999 and, in particular, when it appointed a new director, donor interest was 
rekindled.   
 
The project started in March 2000 with a preparatory assistance phase funded by the 
government of Denmark. The project document “Capacity Building for the National 
Demining Institute” was signed in August 2000. Initially planned for three years, with a 
budget of USD 3.7 million, the project eventually ran from 2001-2005 at a cost of USD 7 
million. The project also served to channel bilateral donor funds for survey and 
clearance. At the beginning of the project, a small parallel emergency UNDP project 
called “Flood Related Mine Action” also ran from October 2000 to December 2001.   
 
Although the capacity-building project ended in 2005, there was some continuity in the 
form of a UNDP-funded chief technical advisor post. To date, it has been occupied by 
three people, usually with a gap of several months between the departure of one and 
the arrival of another
33
. Since 2008, IND capacity development has been supported 
under a new project, “Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming Mine Action, Small 
Arms and Light Weapons Controls 2008-2011”.  
 
The bulk of the funds for the mine action component (USD 950,000) were designated 
for clearance, and USD 320,000 were earmarked to build capacity and high level 
technical support. Some small amounts were designated for resource mobilisation and 
mainstreaming mine action into government plans.  However, while carrying out this 
study, the researchers found that although the project document had been signed by 
the government, and senior IND managers were aware of clearance assistance coming 
through UNDP, they knew nothing about the project and had never seen the project 
document. 
 
UNICEF 
 
UNICEF provided the MRE technical advisor under the UNDP capacity-building project 
and took the lead in working with the government and NGOs. Together with the 
Mozambique Red Cross in particular, UNICEF was active until 2003. In 2005, a review of 
UNICEF’s activities indicated that there was no longer a serious need for MRE. However, 
it continues to be included in the IND 2008-2014 plan. 
 
                                                    
32
 Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action December 2001 
33
 The last CTA left in December 2010 and as of mid-June 2011 his replacement still had not arrived. 
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DONORS 
 
Annex 2 shows the evolution of mine action funding in Mozambique over the years. 
Since 2002, mine action in the country has been supported by Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the 
USA. 
 
Because the government can contribute only limited financial help to mine action, 
donor assistance has been vital. However, this often very naturally gives donors the final 
say in how a programme evolves.  
 
In the start-up phase, the uncompromising approach of many donors contributed to the 
delay of commercial contracts and led to a mine action centre proposal being shelved, 
and replaced with a weaker National Demining Commission (CND) instead. A reason 
why ADP was never able to shift from a UNDP project to national NGO status is that it 
was not possible to mobilise donor support for the idea. However, simultaneous donor 
funding through humanitarian operators such as NPA and HALO enabled these NGOs to 
fill the vacuum on the ground and determine the areas that would be covered by whom.  
 
Donor funds are provided in a number of ways:  
 
• earmarked support for certain operators 
• contributions to UNDP projects 
• untied or tied funds channelled through UNDP projects 
• funds via an INGO’s own headquarters 
• direct fundraising by the operators themselves  
 
Most of these channels have meant that IND has had little control over where the funds 
went or how they were used, severely curtailing its ownership of the programme. 
However, after the cash-strapped crisis years, funding improved, mainly due to the 
commitment of Norway, and UNDP efforts to mobilise funds from a number of donors.  
Under the current project, both UNDP and IND jointly review the performance of 
clearance operations and analyse needs to agree on resource allocation. 
 
In October 2007, Norway and Mozambique organised a round table to assist strategic 
planning and preparation of the Article 5 extension request.  The two countries later 
signed a memorandum of understanding on annual assistance until Article 5 obligations 
had been met. It also covers cooperation on resource mobilisation, short term technical 
expertise and IND’s coordination of national and international actors. 
 
On the whole, and despite being under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IND has not been 
very proactive in mobilising funds or communicating with donors. The main point of 
 21 
 
contact is the Mine Action Partners Meeting (heads of mission) co-chaired by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP resident Representative.
34
  
 
At the time of writing, HALO is the strongest demining force in the country, and has 
considerable fundraising capacity. Its goals do not necessarily match IND’s plans.  
GOVERNMENT 
 
Government funding usually comprises IND running costs and customs exemptions. IND 
has never included in its reports the cost of military demining operations or the 
proportion of infrastructure rehabilitation costs reserved for mine clearance.  
 
However, the government’s contribution has risen in recent years and has included 
funds for clearance. In 2009, its contribution was double that of the previous year and it 
was the largest single contributor (USD three millions out of a total of USD nine 
millions).
35
  
 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN MINE ACTION: IND AND ADP 
IND 
 
The final report on the emergency flood mine action
36
 project is interesting because, by 
the time it started, the main flood relief effort was over and it appears to have turned to 
capacity development.  The report describes the challenges faced by the new IND as “a 
serious state of affairs” and “a very unstable platform to transform into a solid 
foundation”. There was little concept of a work plan or financial planning. It also noted 
that IND was under great pressure and being forced to take on too many 
responsibilities, for which it was unprepared, instead of concentrating on the basics.  
 
The intended end-of-project situation of the UNDP capacity-building project was:  
 
• competent local technical, administrative and policy formulation mechanisms and 
capacity  
• a mine action plan  
• indigenous mine action capability 
• a mine action strategy with a functioning database  
• a victim assistance policy and stronger support for victims  
• more efficient and effective mine action operations  
                                                    
34
 There are also quarterly stakeholder meetings with operators, UNDP and donor representatives 
35
 IND Annual Report 2009 
36
 Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action Annex 3 “Capacity Building and Support Programmes, 
Bilateral and UNDP support, overview and current status”. undated 
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By the end of the project, many of the stated objectives had been accomplished, in 
particular:  
 
a) The putting in place of the essential elements of a mine action centre:  
 
o procedures 
o plans 
o reporting formats/procedures 
o safety and technical guidelines 
o accreditation criteria and procedures 
o quality assurance management system 
o national standard operating procedures 
o administration 
o finance and logistics systems and procedures 
 
b) The training of staff to assume responsibility for all of the above, and to develop 
staff through: 
o  on the job training 
o some in-house courses and overseas management courses  
 
The biggest challenges were shifting staff from one department to another, language 
barriers,
37
 (some technical advisors didn’t speak Portuguese and staff didn’t speak 
English; essential for the international aspects of mine action), as well as the dual 
pressure of service performance demands and emerging responsibilities while still 
learning.  
 
With mine action generally in its infancy, there was also the problem of change 
management in certain fields. The persistent management challenges were overly-
centralised management, poor internal coordination, discipline and accountability for 
outputs and deadlines and performance problems, issues that were also raised in the 
2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique.   
 
However, the biggest threat to sustainability was the build-up of IND capacity based on 
the (unplanned) recruitment of extra professional staff on UNDP contracts, that 
eventually also forced topping up for existing staff.  Under the initial budget “project 
personnel” (predominantly technical advisors and their travel) was USD 1.9 million, 
about half the budget. By 2005, this had risen to USD 4.3 million and two-thirds of the 
budget. In 2001 there were 13 nationals on the UNDP payroll, in 2004 there were 53.
38
 
 
                                                    
37
 Some TA had problems with Portuguese and staff  didn’t speak English, which was also essential for the 
international aspects of MA 
38
 UNDP Capacity Building Project Annual Reports 
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When the project and UNDP contracts ended in 2005, most of the best qualified staff 
left, including people who benefited most from the training but who found better jobs 
because of it. The situation was aggravated when some of those who wanted to stay 
could not because IND’s limited personnel budget could not accommodate them all.
39
 
Even those who managed to stay had to wait six months until they were formally 
admitted to the civil service and could be paid.   
 
However, it is widely recognised that IND competence has grown in recent years. This is 
partly because the contamination problem was reduced to six provinces. Some staff 
members were transferred out of IND as the workload fell, but the most able and 
experienced were retained, some completing university degree courses part time. Some 
areas have been strengthened to cope with the demands of the new situation eg, 
quality assurance.   
 
Managers who remember IND’s early years recall that, given the pressures of the 
moment, the technical advisors tended to take charge as much as they supported local 
personnel in doing the tasks and make the decisions, and some were not very 
competent. Nevertheless, they acknowledge it as learning experience.  
 
Current IND staff feel that they gained little from the single chief technical advisor 
system, as none of the technical advisors had any specialist mine action knowledge. In 
particular, they point out that the two most important documents for the future of IND 
– the lengthy Article 5 submission and the 2008-2012 plan – were prepared by IND staff 
(with some input from Survey Action Center (SAC) and the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)), at a time when there was no chief technical 
advisor present.  
 
The job description for the new chief technical advisor post is very broad. It covers an 
enormous range of activities, including:  
 
• most of the core functional capacities 
• technical and operational advice 
• organisational and individual capacity development 
• keeping UNDP informed of the mine action situation and donor relations 
 
With a view to the future, it also includes advising on sustainable mine action capacity 
and capacity development plans for IND, the military, police and operators on how to 
handle residual issues.  
 
                                                    
39
 One senior IND staff member commented that during the crisis years the salary of the CTA was equivalent to half 
IND’s budget. The salary issue still upsets senior managers when they compare their government salaries with those 
of colleagues in other countries working on UN-funded MA projects. 
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Current staff have said the main function of the chief technical advisor was to be the 
eyes and ears of UNDP and donors within IND, and so they continue to support the post 
to avoid losing donor funding 
40
   
 
One important point is that if IND does not feel it needs capacity-building assistance and 
is not engaged in planning, then no matter how good the chief technical advisor is, he or 
she will not be able to achieve much. 
ADP 
 
Under the UNDP project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) received a great 
deal of capacity-building support. This came mostly through teams of military technical 
advisors on six-month secondments, and training in the skills required for a typical mine 
action programme: 
 
• clearance 
• quality assurance 
• machinery maintenance  
• dog handling 
 
In the process, through its Moamba training centre, ADP became a focal point for 
capacity development. This was lost to Mozambique when ADP collapsed, although its 
expertise is still benefiting mine action programmes in other countries through 
recruitment for RONCO and demining firms. 
 
                                                    
40
 UNDP comments that the CTA is provided at the request of IND and it approves the TOR for the post. 
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME – RECONFIGURATION PHASE 
 
 
The 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in 
Mozambique concluded that the: 
 
• humanitarian impact of mines had been greatly reduced 
• number of victims had fallen substantially  
• growing challenge was supporting development priorities  
 
It also concluded that Mozambique would not be clear of mines in the foreseeable 
future, with the biggest challenge being IND’s inability to provide a clear picture of 
contamination. The study highlighted the vague mine free/mine impact free concept, 
the need for a link between mine action and development, and problems with the 
institutional set-up.  
 
However, much has changed since then. The initial catalyst was the 2007 Mine Impact 
Free District (MIFD) report that reduced the country’s suspected hazardous area by half. 
Formal verification and handover have proceeded in these and other provinces, where 
the district-by-district approach has greatly simplified planning, monitoring and 
verification. By 2010, 50 of Mozambique’s 128 districts had been declared mine free, 
with the prospect of a further 42 in 2011.  
 
The MIFD and the baseline assessment provided sufficient information for 
Mozambique’s detailed request for an Article 5 extension. In addition, after two 
previous plans with revisions
41
 based on shaky data, they enabled IND to prepare a 
definitive evidence-based national mine action plan for 2008 to 2014, to achieve 
compliance, with a year-by-year clearance budget. Although a major step forward, the 
“evidence” was in fact far from accurate. On the one hand, there were the above-
mentioned data problems in Maputo province.  On the other hand a number of known 
major problems such as the large minefields around the Cahora Bassa dam and along 
the Zimbabwe border had not been quantified when the plan was drafted, although 
their estimated clearance cost was included in the budget and there were a number of 
known but unvisited sites. Consequently, while the 2008-2014 plan could only cite 541 
known mined areas with 12.1 million m2, a preliminary IND report on the three years 
2008-2010 shows that the figures had risen to 822 tasks and 23.4 million m2. Of these, 
486 tasks/9.2 million m2 were cleared during that period – equivalent to 92 per cent 
and 105 per cent of the respective quantified targets in the Five-Year Plan.  
 
                                                    
41
 2007-2009, 2008-2012 
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The geographical division of the country by operator remains, with HALO Trust in 
Maputo, Manica and Tete, Handicap International in Inhambane and Sofala, and APOPO 
in Gaza, although IND has to some extent since had a say in the distribution. 
 
However, there has since been a recovery in donor funding, mostly due to the clearer 
picture, the new Article 5 compliance target, the Norwegian commitment, and 
mobilisation by UNDP and HALO. There was also a substantial rise in government 
funding; to USD 3 million in 2009, when it was the largest single contributor to the 
programme. Mine action has been included as a cross-cutting issue in the government’s 
five-year plan, approved at the first sitting of the current legislature. 
 
Planning methods have been changed to accommodate the district-by-district approach. 
It has been clearly established that the aim is not mine impact free but mine free
42
, and 
there is a strong emphasis on land release to increase efficiency. Official procedures for 
the declaration of district mine free status and the role of local authorities have been 
established and distributed to operators and government entities. Revised MMAS and 
standard operating procedures have been prepared.  
 
In line with the government’s decentralisation policy, provincial governments will play a 
key role in mine action:  
 
• setting priorities 
• monitoring mine action 
• provision of mine risk education (MRE)  
• validation of mine free status with IND  
 
Provincial Demining Commissions have been created, with members from development 
and security wings of government to take on some of these responsibilities.
43
 IND is 
being restructured to meet the new challenges and has reduced staff, from 68 
employees in 2006 to around 40 in 2010,and aiming toward a target of 20 by 2014. 
                                                    
42
 Defined as “All districts where there are no mined areas or known suspected areas” 
43
 Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance, Provincial Police Command and the army  with optional 
representation by other sectors in line with the mine-related issues in each province e.g. tourism in Inhambane and 
mineral resources in Tete 
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
DECISION-MAKING AND THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION TO 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
Responsibility for decision-making and the transition process are interconnected. The 
mine action programme in Mozambique has never been through a consistent, coherent 
process that culminated in a single formal transition decision point, or a single plan on 
how such a point would be reached. There have been several transition variants arising 
from a number of muddled processes. The main transition features in Mozambique are:  
 
• Throughout the various mine action processes, ownership was always conditional on 
control over money and where it went. Government contribution was minimal until 
recently, meaning that donors and the operators who prepared project proposals 
for funding had the greatest decision-making power on how much was spent and 
where.   
 
• Transition from large commercial operators to a “national” mine action capability in 
the form of ADP (a UNDP project) was the product of an improvised process during a 
confused ONUMOZ era that was never clearly thought through. It was an 
“indigenous” entity in composition but not in institutional form.  Failure to resolve 
this conundrum is one of the tragedies of mine action in Mozambique.  
 
• There was no transition process from ONUMOZ to CND per se, just a gap between 
one starting and one ending. Post-ONUMOZ donor pressure pushed the government 
into producing a weak CND that combined both authority and MAC functions with 
inappropriate leadership to address complex issues and cultivate sound donor 
relations. Its position under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation diluted 
the internal governmental attention the sector needed. A more suitable and 
workable plan, with the relevant capacity-building support, should have been put in 
place before or just after ONUMOZ closed.  
 
• Transition to IND, UNDP and potential ownership – IND had the benefit of a new 
director and a UNDP capacity-building project that managed to establish more solid 
foundations, although many of the people it trained left. However, the biggest 
problem was that the independent operators had become entrenched in their three 
regions and IND did not have sufficient authority over them and, therefore, over the 
national mine action programme. Nevertheless, three years after the project ended, 
with the MIFD and baseline assessment data and a little outside help, IND staff were 
able to prepare an Article 5 extension request and the national mine action plan for 
2008 to 2014.  
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• It is difficult to unravel the effects of the official end of the UNDP project in 2005 
and other events that contributed to the crisis years. Nevertheless, the decision to 
hire qualified people on contract, in order to achieve “end of project” objectives was 
opportunistic, short-sighted and indeed dishonest, as it was obvious that the best 
would not stay. Also, the project technical advisors failed to steer IND in the 
direction of a plausible alternative to the LIS and UNDP’s collaboration in the LIS-
based first IND plan. The collapse of donor support also had a UNDP footprint: its 
involvement in the Adopt a Minefield scandal and the disintegration of ADP 
undermined its hitherto significant role in mobilising funding for mine action.   
 
• The departure of a number of international operators could have been turned to 
IND’s advantage, providing the ideal opportunity for a transition to an ADP-based 
national operational capability
44
 and national ownership. Instead ADP was allowed 
to collapse. Donor reluctance was only part of the problem. The root cause was that 
it was conceived as a project, not a national demining organisation receiving outside 
support (possibly in project form). Therefore, the emphasis was on demining 
operations, not transition. What came afterwards was an improvised panic 
response. Consequently, some responsibility for the outcome of ADP’s 11 years as a 
UNDP project must lie with UNDP. Another major part, however, lies with the 
government. If it was truly interested in having a strong, national mine action 
capability, the government could have made it happen. It did not.   
 
• The turning point in IND’s assertion of ownership came with the MIFD and baseline 
assessment. The IND personnel who prepared the Article 5 extension request were 
initially recruited under the UNDP capacity-building project. They received training 
through other means, such as practical experience, rotation through different 
departments, short courses and interacting with colleagues from other mine action 
programmes, and some also obtained university degrees. Although UNDP’s 
involvement in capacity development was the heaviest and most costly, a number of 
smaller agencies have for many years provided consistent assistance focused on 
specific areas as and when needed. For example, SAC and the GICHD have made a 
vital and possibly more lasting contribution than the isolated CTAs.  
 
One persistently weak point with ownership implications is IND’s difficulty in addressing 
what comes after information is gathered. It is presented in annual reports as facts and 
descriptions, with little or no analysis; there are no in-depth studies of a key issue or 
problem. This may be due to a lack of time, although two senior staff members 
specifically mentioned analytical capacity/skills as being a challenge and constraint. 
                                                    
44
 According to the former ADP director as early as 2003 there were informal approaches by departing operators who 
hoped that  ADP would take over from them 
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Areas that could warrant more in-depth attention include demining costs
45 
and operator 
productivity. 
 
 
In the final transitional push to a mine free Mozambique, IND is undoubtedly 
performing better and is gaining more discretionary access to resources. However, the 
operator challenge persists. There is a small operator (APOPO), a somewhat larger and 
stronger one (HI) and a very large and powerful one (HALO Trust) with strong 
fundraising capacity and, therefore, the freedom to apply those funds where and how it 
sees fit. This places certain constraints on IND ownership as it seeks to pursue its 2014 
target in the way it sees fit.  It has also been pointed out however, that, if IND had a 
stronger set of national rules and regulations in place, which all operators would have to 
adhere to, its leadership role would be considerably strengthened.  
 
ISSUES FACING MORE MATURE MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES 
 
Every country has different contamination problems, ways of addressing them and 
capacity to do so. In Mozambique, one of the targets of the 2008-2014 plan is to 
prepare for residual mine and UXO contamination. The main tasks are:  
 
• defining and building the capacity of the entity that will deal with these 
• preparation of an action plan for residual contamination, including funds for 
survey and clearance  
• action on both mine risk education and victim assistance 
 
The various preparatory measures mentioned in section 4 reflect some of the concerns. 
 
An overview of the Mozambican experience raises the following issues: 
 
a) The importance of the database and correctly recording figures so that: 
 
•  survey and clearance records are correct and up to date 
• the outstanding tasks for survey or full clearance are known and can be 
planned for  
• there is a notion of the likely kind of residual problems  
 
b) Mine action information should be easily available to development and investment 
entities that intend to work in a given area. Any data on subsequent measures 
should be recorded correctly, stored in a timely fashion and be available to those 
who need it. 
                                                    
45
 IND reportedly asked the private operators to get together and come up with a reference price. Needless to say 
they came up with the highest figure discussed.  
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c) The importance of identifying the likely residual problems and the capabilities 
needed to address them in the field, eg survey, clearance, explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), quality assurance, mine risk education, handover and information 
management. Although there is as yet no clear plan for Mozambique, there are 
some positive signs: 
 
• provincial/district authorities will now be responsible for confirming new 
problems and organising appropriate solutions eg EOD, contacting a 
clearance entity  
• the police will be responsible for EOD, with training underway 
• the army will be responsible for clearance 
 
d) There are many private operators in Mozambique, and they are in many instances 
poorly controlled and with dubious capacity. For this reason, more rigorous licensing 
rules and decisions about reducing their number is required, and the demand for 
and control over private operators needs to be studied, including quality assurance 
and reporting. Under the current set-up, work for private operators is insufficient to 
ensure the financial viability of any company. Once Mozambique has fulfilled its 
clearance obligations under the Ottawa convention, there will probably be even less 
work, although “precautionary surveys” by investors might increase.  
 
The current rough division of responsibility for resources has seen humanitarian 
operations (mainly donor-funded) working to clear not only minefields that impact 
on communities, but also supporting development projects such as power and 
railway lines. HALO’s current clearance of electricity pylons with donor funds is 
justified on various grounds:  
 
• local communities and/or their resources (eg cattle) are affected 
• the development brought about by more secure power supplies eventually has an 
impact on the well-being of communities  
• HALO has assumed full responsibility for ensuring that Maputo province achieves 
mine free status   
 
Major public development projects (eg roads) have invariably included a budget 
item for survey and clearance by commercial operators, although this practice is 
declining as more areas are cleared. Investors also hire commercial operators for 
their own survey and clearance requirements and will probably continue to do so 
whenever they feel there is a need, even in areas that have been declared mine free 
by IND.   
 
Much has been said about the inclusion of mine action in the government’s plans, 
first as a “cross-cutting” issue and now the need for “mainstreaming”. 
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Mainstreaming implies inclusion in sector plans, with financial provision in the 
budget. For example, several years ago, MRE was successfully mainstreamed by the 
Ministry of Education through teacher training, at little or no extra cost. Surveys and 
clearance, however, are a different matter. In keeping with decentralisation, it 
seems that a special allocation in the provincial budgets has been considered, 
although there has also been reference to provisions in a globalising ministry
46
 or in 
the individual sector ministries most likely to be affected, such as the departments 
of public works and agriculture. However, unless this is made mandatory, in a “mine 
free” Mozambique, far greater needs are bound to crowd out provision for a 
possible but as-of-yet unknown mine action requirement.
47
  On the other hand, if 
the army is to become responsible for residual issues, this would surely have to be 
covered by its regular budget.
48
 
 
e) The institutional set-up and a clear definition of responsibilities; central, provincial 
and district. This involves what legal form a future IND/MAC equivalent will take, its 
structure and responsibilities, where it will be placed, and the composition and role 
of an eventual national authority.  
 
f) As an organisation matures and acquires more experience and capacity short term 
technical advisors or consultancy support, it will be far more productive and 
effective than a long term UNDP technical advisor position with generic terms of 
reference. 
 
g) The end is in sight but there are still many challenges for IND before it is achieved. It 
is possible that, over the next two years or so before Article 5 compliance with 
APMBC obligations is achieved (which may or may not happen); there could still be 
capacity constraints. However, if these are to be identified correctly and addressed, 
it must be an IND initiative.  
                                                    
46
 A ministry with responsibilities that impact on all or many sector ministries such as the Ministry of Development, 
the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Public Administration 
47
 Although it has been suggested that any identified need could be included in the relevant sector’s budget the 
following year.  
48
 It is highly unlikely that the Vietnamese experience of sector ministry, provincial/district government, donor and 
investor funding of army clearance would be an option in Mozambique. 
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KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT 
 
Some findings of the 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action 
Programme in Mozambique remain relevant to the issue of transition to national 
ownership.  
 
• Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more 
difficult to put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination and 
ownership of the process. 
 
A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with 
established programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the 
problem and leaves the government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it 
advances a better conceived coordination mechanism. 
 
In Mozambique, a weak central body enabled operators to proceed and consolidate 
their positions, however their independently growing strength and knowledge made 
it difficult for national capacity to develop. However, it is also possible that with a 
different institutional set-up and more government commitment to mine action, 
IND could have been strengthened. 
 
• A key element of government ownership is its ability to collect accurate data on 
suspected hazardous areas and their impact, and to guarantee the efficient storage 
of this information. This means ensuring a match between addressing the need for: 
 
o clear, reliable information on contamination (location)  
o an assessment of the impact of this contamination on communities and 
development programmes  
 
This requires close coordination between central and local government entities and 
operators on the ground. The central mine action entity must have the ability to: 
 
o develop these norms and guidelines 
o establish a single set of impact criteria 
o ensure that they are being applied and record the information received 
promptly and efficiently  
 
If it does not develop this capacity, the operators will lead the process, and in so 
doing produce separate information and government control of the situation will 
remain weak.  
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In Mozambique, the LIS was conducted by an external entity, did not engage with 
operators and used impact indicators that were considered irrelevant by all the 
actors involved. The operators applied their own systems and criteria. 
 
• An efficient and effective database system is of crucial importance: 
 
o for planning and treaty compliance purposes  
o as a permanent source of accurate information as clearance efforts wind 
down  
 
The move to “impact free” status and “residual” contamination must remain at a 
high level of importance, even as other government functions decline database 
management capacity. This has not been the case in IND although the recent 
decision to shift the database from the planning to the operations department is an 
important step. 
 
• When building a post-conflict mine action centre from scratch, the immediate 
pressure is to get the job done, particularly as lives are at stake. However, the 
option of cutting corners by hiring staff outside the government system and with 
remuneration considerably higher than public sector salary levels is self-defeating 
and the antithesis of institutional capacity development. It causes conflict with 
existing public service staff and those trained leave as soon as the funding runs out.  
 
However, if the departure of this additional manpower coincides with a substantial 
reduction in the problems to be tackled (or the challenges are not as great as 
initially anticipated), then a short term intensive manpower approach could be 
justified. It could then be reduced to a downsized core team of experienced 
permanent staff to oversee winding down of the programme and the transition to a 
residual mine action capacity. To some extent this is what has happened in 
Mozambique but by default, not as part of a strategy. The abrupt and unplanned 
transition resulted in serious repercussions for both IND capacity and the mine 
action programme. 
 
• An effective public mine action entity requires: 
 
o technical expertise  
o good management skills 
o an appropriate organisational structure and system and administrative 
procedures  
 
If the institutional capacity development of technical advisors is to be effective, 
senior management must recognise the above needs and work to ensure internal 
organisational development. Without this commitment, no amount of external 
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assistance can build an effective organisation. Then, as the programme matures, 
management should improve networking/mobilisation skills within government to 
ensure that other public entities play their part.  
 
The absence of a mine action authority, the unusual institutional location of IND 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fact that the IND director has always 
come from an international relations/diplomacy background have probably not 
provided the best context for the mine action programme in Mozambique. To a 
certain extent, this reflects  
 
a) the origins of IND  
b) how mine action was put lower on the government’s policy and development 
agenda when the problem turned out to be less acute than initially predicted. 
Given the relatively few mine incidents over the last decade this position is 
understandable. 
 
As the main effort draws to a close, much more thought is going into the post-
compliance organisational set-up than occurred during the establishment of IND. 
 
• The relationship between an “aid provider” or “fund manager” and the beneficiary is 
often not an easy one. Given the current stage of mine action in Mozambique, a 
“project/chief technical advisor” structure might be less useful than a number of 
short term consultancies focusing on issues of particular relevance to the current 
downsizing phase. However, IND regularly requests a chief technical advisor, 
seemingly to ensure the continued flow of funds. UNDP says it provides a chief 
technical advisor because IND requests one. Often, the incumbent chief technical 
advisor finds there is little he can advise on, or the advice is unwelcome.  
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1 
 
Surveys in Mozambique – actual and intended 
 
Who When Findings 
UN 1992 “Back of an envelope” estimate of two million mines in Mozambique 
HALO 1993 
 
Rough emergency survey by HALO identified 981 mined areas provided; input for 
the first SHAMAN database on SHA 
NPA 1998-99 
 
Intending to conduct a ”Level 1 survey” documenting what was already done and   
identifying what remained to be done in Tete, Manica and Sofala (planned but 
perhaps not carried out) 
HI 1998-99 
 
A survey of the southern province where it was based - Inhambane - gathering 
logistical information, socio-economic data aimed at a risk-based and demining 
value-added prioritisation (planned but perhaps not carried out) 
CIDC 2000-01 
 
A flawed Landmine Impact Survey found 123 out of 128 districts contaminated; 
1,374 SMAs affecting 1,488,998 people in 791 communities, affected area of 
562km
2
.  This was totally different to the real situation. 
HALO 2004-07 
 
A Mine Impact Free District exercise in four centre-north provinces (Zambézia. 
Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado) identified and cleared 74 new SHAs. It then 
declared that there were no known areas left to demine   
NPA 2005-06 
 
Prior to leaving Mozambique conducted a Task Impact Assessment of  all centre-
south provinces (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) 
HI 2006-07 
 
Comprehensive  village by village survey of  the centre-south mix of provinces 
where it was operating - Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane 
HALO 2007 
 
Baseline assessment carried out of all known centre-south provinces (Tete, 
Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) based on IND database/LIS, HI 
and NPA surveys.  Visited 1,844 sites, cancelled 1,192, identified 484 mined areas 
(later increased to 541), 165 spot UXO sites, 33 mined roads and six battle area 
clearance tasks. While demining HALO found another 43 sites and additional 
area of 1.5 million square metres
 
  
IND 2008- 
 
District by district verification of the HALO survey of the four centre-north 
provinces identified a further 43 SMAs and 34 UXO sites.  
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ANNEX 2 
 
Funding for the mine action programme 
 
Table 1: Funding for the mine action programme 1999-2009 (million USD) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
State 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.9 1.3 7.6 2.1 1.3 1.3 1.56 3.0 24.76 
Donor 12.0 17.0 15.1 16.9 18.1 14.4 15.0 6.2 2.7 4.3 5.9 127.6 
Total 12.2 17.2 15.4 22.8 19.4 22.0 17.1 7.5 4.0 5.86 8.9 152.36 
%             
State 2% 1% 2% 26% 7% 35% 12% 17% 33% 27% 34% 16% 
Donor 98% 99% 
Source: Mozambique’s Article 5 extension request; 2008 and 2009 annual reports 
 
The mine action programme in Mozambique is financed mainly by the international 
community. The state usually finances the activities of IND and contributes tax exemption for 
the goods and equipments used in demining. The Mozambican army’s contribution is never 
included. However, in recent years the state budget has also provided funds for demining, and 
over the period 2007-2009 it contributed around a third of all funds (Total USD 18.8 of which 
USD 5.9 government and USD 12.9 donors).  
 
Table 2: Costs for the extension period presented in the Article 5 extension request (USD) 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total 
Demining 6,689,145 5,662,595 5,945,724 6,140,993 3,538,500 27,976,957 
IND 2,021,800 1,853,800 1,309,500 930,200 863,200 6,978,500 
TOTAL  8,710,945 7,516,395 7,255,224 7,071,193 4,401,700 34,955,457 
 
Table 3: Projections Mine Action Plan 2008-2014 (USD) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Surveys and demining 3.819.000 6.957.306 8.440.418 4.931.906 1.752.090 835.540 26,736,260 
Cahora Bassa dam   913.596    913,596 
Mp-Komatiport  pylons   1.000.000    1,000,000 
Survys /dem Zim border  125.000     125,000 
SubTotal demining 3.819.000 7,082,306 10,354,014 4.931.906 1.752.090 835.540 28,774,856 
Demining QA 893.680 479.344 537.456 617.839 600.834 600.834 3,729,987 
Information 
management 
371.530 199.727 223.940 257.433 250.348 250.348 
1,553,326 
Coordination 743.060 399.453 447.880 514.866 500.695 500.695 2,658,769 
Civic education 230.000 279.617 313.516 360.406 350.487 350.487 1,884,513 
Total estimated cost 6.057.270 8.440.447 11.876.806 6.682.450 3.454.454 2.537.904 39,049,331 
        
State budget funds 1.563.270 1.800.000 2.000.000 2.500.000 2.500.000 1.700.000 12,063,270 
International  funds 4.494.000 6.640.447 9.876.806 4.182.450 954.454 837.904 26,986,061 
Total funds 6.057.270 8.440.447 11.876.806 6.682.450 3.454.454 2.537.904 39,049,331 
% state 26% 21% 17% 37% 72% 67% 31% 
% GOM 74% 79% 83% 63% 28% 33% 69% 
Source: National Mine Action Plan 2008-2014 
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Of the total USD 39 million needed to implement this plan, it is expected that USD 12 million 
will be provided by the government through the state budget and USD 27 million by donors. 
 
Table 4: Funds channelled through UNDP in 2010 in USD 
Operator Total Source 
HALO (13%) 455,010 50,000 DFID 
  80,000 AusAid 
  170,000 UNDP Trac 1 
  155,010 UNDP Trac 3 
    
HI (37%) 1,337,558 50,000 DFID 
  140,000 AusAid 
  140,000 UNDP Trac 1 
  200,000 Japan 
  807,558 UN Trust Fund 
    
APOPO  (23%) 818,977.97 161,423.94 DFID 
  150,000 Italy 
  201,688.02 UN Trust Fund 
  305, 866,01 Japan 
    
MECHEM (3%) 121,754.22 121,754.22 Japan 
    
IND (24%) 868,997.93 273,532.04 Trac 1 
  79,037.60 DFID 
  30,962.31 Italy 
  124,002.12 Japan 
  82,499.68 Australian Aid 
  210,188.53 UN Trust Fund 
  68,775.65 Trac 3 
    
TOTAL (100%) 3,602,298.12 340,462 DFID (9%) 
  302,500 AusAid (8%) 
  807,318 UNDP Trac  (22%) 
  1,219,435 UN Trust Fund (34%) 
  751,622 Japan (21%) 
  180,962 Italy (5%) 
   3,602,298.12 (100%) 
         Source: UN SALW Annual Report 2010 and additional information from UNDP  
 
UN/UNDP contributed the largest amount; 56 per cent. The largest beneficiary was IND itself, 
almost one quarter of the funds. 
 
According to the IND annual report; in 2009, mine action received almost USD 9 million (both 
funds received through UNDP and also other funds).  
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ANNEX 3 
 
Capacity-building assessments 
 
1. Summary of IND capacity-building and support programmes – bilateral and UNDP 
supported: overview and current status (2001) 
 
(Attachment to terminal report for MOZ/00/004 “Flood Related Mine Action”) 
 
 
a) Background 
 
In September 1999, the government of Mozambique established the new National Demining 
Institute and, under donor pressure, appointed a new director. 
 
b) General Achievements 
 
• Major change in attitude from 1999. CND was had not achieved much result when it was 
transformed into IND, leaving a very unstable platform to transform into a solid foundation 
• IND produced a strategy for the next five years covering mine awareness, location and 
clearance of mined areas, training, human resources without much input from the TA, and 
an activity plan for 2002 
• First meeting of the interministerial Technical Council in December 2000, to establish this 
forum, and a second meeting in March 2001 to establish priorities 
• First meeting of the operators working group in August 2000, the second in November 
2000. Operators thereafter decided to meet once a year  
• Quarterly meetings with donors established 
• CTA and IND developed a document on donor support 
 
 
c) Current Status 
 
Information and Planning  
 
• The most important department of IND has a staff of seven (the head of department, a 
database supervisor responsible for outputs, a data entry supervisor and four input clerks). 
It records all information, distributes and determines mine action priorities. It also produced 
a strategy, mission plan, activity plan and the overview of mine action for 2000 
 
• Database has been restored to working order. Hardware and networking equip was set up 
and software installed. Existing data was translated into EVISMA format and new report 
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formats distributed to operators. Basic training in IMSMA. A technical advisor from Canada 
helped IND by providing invaluable assistance. IND staff could not have performed this task 
unassisted as it involved in-depth hardware and computer science knowledge 
 
• Database personnel worked through all the Level 2 and 3 reports and any inaccurate reports 
were referred to operators for rectification. This was a slow but necessary process to get 
the database to the required standard. Staff did 35 reports a day  
 
• Level 1 Survey (LIS) has almost been concluded, and information transferred to the National 
Database. It will provide a benchmark of the mine problem and enable this department to 
produce a national mine action plan 
 
• Personnel have good language capability and the necessary qualifications 
 
• Requests for information are now dealt with within 48 hours. A database can produce mine 
maps that indicate suspect areas. Most information requirements are from government or 
NGOs involved in development or other commercial operations. Few requests are received 
from the three main operators. 
 
What is needed: 
 
- Decentralisation to regional offices 
- More training and latest IMSMA 
- Operator training in new reporting formats 
- Forums for distribution of information 
- A mine action plan after completing Level 1 activities 
- Establishment of a system for tasking, tracking and completion of tasks 
 
Operations:  
 
• Mine action projects have been developed 
• There are work plans for a flood emergency programme 
• Tender procedures have been reviewed and the system is very transparent. Selection 
criteria had been clearly defined and tender committee established. IND is still 
inexperienced but is learning by training, practical experience and lessons learned 
• Standard operating procedures have been developed for all categories of mine action. 
Accreditation Procedures have been developed but new International Standards are still to 
be finalised. Quality control procedures will be concluded as soon as international standards 
are finalised 
• Training is given in priority topics where IND is having difficulty to prepare and interpret 
proposals: 
 
- Mine action information requirements 
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- Use of explosive detection dogs 
- Use of mechanical assisted mine clearance 
- Calculating productivity 
- Preparation of a scope of work 
- Preparation of a request for proposals 
 
What is needed: 
 
Operations personnel have a good demining background but some weaknesses need to be 
addressed through training: 
 
- Problem solving 
- Technical analyses 
- Technical interpretation 
- Technical evaluations 
- Investigation of accidents 
- Technical reports 
- Quality assurance and quality control 
 
Human Resources:  
 
• The HR department consists of one head and an assistant responsible for TOR, 
advertising, recruitment and determining training requirements 
• Any new staff recruited are of a high standard 
• Salaries are a problem; most of the new staff are recruited for temporary projects, so 
their capacity will be lost as soon as these support projects end 
 
What is needed: 
 
- Staff are capable of performing duties but have difficulty in determining training 
requirements for staff development. General management and personnel development 
training is required 
 
- Salary issues need to be resolved. This involves consolidating all support programmes, 
including the Government of Mozambique (GOM) contribution, and creating one budget 
for IND, addressing all outstanding requirements. The GOM must approve the final 
budget. 
 
Administration and finance:  
 
• Comprises the department head, two accountants, one procurement and inventory control 
clerk. It is responsible for all administration and finance matters in IND, as well as managing 
three secretaries, six drivers and three cleaners. A technical advisor arrived in March 2001  
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• The department was disorganised, and staff did not have clearly defined responsibilities. 
There were no administrative working forms or procedures, no accounting principles or 
standards and no accounting tools for record purposes  
• Objectives were established: 
o Job descriptions and responsibilities were developed 
o information and reporting were clearly defined and given direction 
o administrative working procedures and forms were established with a set of 
accounting principles 
 
• On the job training started soon after the administrative and financial systems were in place 
 
• The technical advisor for the administration and finance has regular sessions with national   
counterpart, to develop leadership skills including supervising, planning, controlling and 
monitoring 
 
What is needed: 
 
• The system is not flexible for urgent requirements. Coordination needs to be further 
improved and instructions channelled through the head of the department 
 
• There are training needs: 
 
- General management 
- Administrative and financial procedures 
- Budget controls 
- Budget revisions 
- Financial reporting procedures 
- Inventory control 
- Procurement procedures 
 
 
International Relations:  
 
• One person deals with all issues relating to projects: status of funding, visas and work 
permits. There is a fine line where the responsibility of the national director stops and 
the department’s starts. 
 
 
What is needed: 
 
- Improve communications with donors 
- Keep persons informed of progress 
- Timely notification of events 
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- Interaction with the other departments 
 
 
d) General Achievements 
 
• National Director: has a clear vision of where he wants to go and is committed but needs to 
improve coordination and delegation and should be more patient in achieving objectives in 
order to maintain quality 
 
• Deputy Director: has no clear function or responsibility and executes tasks as instructed by 
the National Director. Director must delegate to the Deputy a clear line function. 
 
• Coordination needs improvement 
 
• Basic training needs have been identified. Formal management training has been arranged 
for IND department heads that will take three months. 
 
• Mandate and responsibilities: IND has an extensive mandate and has acquired more 
responsibility than it was originally prepared for. Objectives are reached but results are 
sometimes below standard. Pressure from all levels to deliver results has forced IND to 
perform above its capacity. This can result in hasty action without proper consideration for 
the longer term consequences or outcomes. IND is judged by its performance, which can 
impact negatively on confidence levels. 
 
• Capacity development:  
 
- For capacity development to succeed in IND, commitment, dedication and enthusiasm 
is needed from national counterparts, especially senior management. There is room for 
improvement at other levels, and staff need to be motivated. 
 
- Training will play a major role in improving skills in IND but it is up to nationals to put 
effort into their work. They should emphasise training, be involved in resolving 
problems, and play an active training role when required. Technical advisors also need 
training to keep them abreast of the latest developments and improve their knowledge 
and ability to transfer skills. 
 
e) Conclusions 
 
• IND has improved significantly over the last 12 months, mainly due to the national 
director and his staff making an effort to achieve results and improve accessibility and 
communication with operators and partners. There is a need to emphasise improving 
coordination, tasking and sharing of information 
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• Departments are in an acceptable shape and the needs to improve them further have 
been identified. Coordination must be improved within the various departments and 
procedures for information flow between departments have been established 
 
• The IND is taking on too many responsibilities, mainly because of external pressure to 
demonstrate it is achieving results. They should instead concentrate on getting the 
basics sorted take on further responsibilities only when ready  
 
• Technical decision-making is improving and problems are being analysed before 
decisions are made. A lot of emphasis is placed on this area to maintain continuity in the 
decision-making process  
 
• All TAs were put in place before the end of June 2001 to improve the quality of outputs. 
TA functions are to train IND staff to enable them to perform their tasks. Training of TAs 
is also recommended to improve their knowledge on current technologies and to enable 
them to transfer knowledge 
 
• IND in general is showing encouraging results and continued support is recommended. 
Support programmes should be revised and consolidated to ensure all requirements of 
IND are fully covered 
 
2. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique, 
October 2005 (1) 
 
The 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique 
referred to a 2001 study by a consultant who made various capacity- building 
recommendations. It produced the following table on the status of implementation of the 
consultant’s recommendations at that time.   
 
Main recommendation Sub recommendation Progress 
• Match mandate to capacity 
 
• Focus mandate and priorities to match 
resources. 
Some 
• Develop multi-year business plan and 
budget to correspond to activities 
Some 
• Build capacities related to priorities as 
stated in the work plan 
Some 
• Strengthen the institute’s 
internal management 
• Reorganise and strengthen the 
management council into a working senior 
management committee 
No 
• Restructure the office of the deputy 
director to take direct responsibility for 
operations 
No 
• Clarify roles and reporting relationships No 
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• Address human resource 
management challenges 
• Ensure smooth working relationships 
between TA and counterparts by holding 
workshops 
No 
• Improve operations • Ensure effective transfer of data from CIDC 
to IND 
Yes 
• Strengthen IND database by conducting 
client satisfaction surveys 
No 
• Outsource QA to contractors No 
• Strengthen regional offices Some 
• Decentralise authority to regional offices No 
• Create a regional office for the south in the 
headquarters 
No 
• Create a LAN for internal communications Yes 
• Provide PCs to all managers Yes 
• Create IND web site Yes 
• Improve external relations 
management 
• Use governance bodies provided to create 
value for mine action community 
No 
• Publish regular newsletter for community 
needs 
Yes 
 
 
3. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique, 
October 2005 (2) 
 
The report (written during the crisis years) contained a number of recommendations relevant 
to capacity development, performance and the transition to a sustainable solution for 
Mozambique’s contamination problem, most of which were not accepted/implemented. 
 
 Recommendations: number and summary 
 
 
1,  2, 3 
 
IND should meet with operators (HALO, NPA, HI, ADP) to discuss their 
understanding of “mine impact free” and formulate a common definition; to discuss 
alternative approaches to systematic resurvey leading to reduced, defined SHAs and 
preliminary classification; to agree upon the information management system to 
ensure IMSMA data are correct and up to date 
 
 
9,10 
 
Inclusion of mine action in government development plans 
 
 
12,13, 14 
 
GOM should establish an interministerial body to serve as a national authority, a 
mine action centre and a board of directors to oversee implementation of its mine 
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action policy 
 
 
15, 20  
 
On capacity development: 
 
• CTA should assess existing capacities for analysing data and providing technical 
advisory services to GOM and the public sector and prepare the respective 
capacity development plan 
• To initiate the next stage of capacity development IND Director, with CTA 
support, should establish a performance management approach, set 
performance management targets, monitor performance and take appropriate 
capacity development action    
 
 
16,17,18, 
19 
 
 
Steps in the formulation of a national mine action strategy with donor collaboration 
but GOM in the driving seat, based on an accurate needs assessment  
 
 
 
 
